You can see and read us, we cannot get to you . Out bound email is also a possible problem so email email@example.com (if and when you can) to get messages out and we will relay them to their destination.
To explain to everyone else this is a full cyber siege of Georgia’s cyber space:
As an update; within the community, our friends in Germany had managed to pierce the siege and gain a direct routing to Georgia via AS3320 DTAG Deutsche Telekom for a few hours. this afternoon. For the time being AS8359 COMSTAR Direct Moscow region network CJSC COMSTAR Direct Smolenskaya Sennaya Sq, 27 block 2 119121 Moscow, Russia, have intercepted this and are redirecting this route of cyber traffic via their servers. The good news is other German servers are now also attempting to access Georgia servers directly.
We are receiving further offers to help reroute traffic which is underway in an attempt to lift the siege. Further offers are welcome.
For those of a technical nature we show the latest server routing map (see diagram below) which clearly shows the Russian based servers AS12389 ROSTELECOM, AS8342 RTCOMM, and AS8359 COMSTAR, controlling all traffic to Georgia’s key servers. For example here AS28751 CAUCASUS NET AS Caucasus Network Tbilisi, Georgia & AS20771 DeltaNet Autonomous System DeltaNet ltd 0179 Tbilisi Georgia
Even the Turkish (often RBN controlled) server AS9121 TTNet is now being blocked via COMSTAR, we understand via colleagues in Istanbul, the Turkish authorities are trying to regain control of these servers and provide direct routing to Georgia.
At this time all Georgia government web sites are unobtainable from US, UK, FR, and DE cyber space, as examples. All blog colleagues elsewhere please contact us if you are able to gain direct web access inbound.
We also relay, as requested, the warning not to depend on any web sites that 'appear' of a Georgia official source, but are without any recent statements i.e. Friday / Saturday Aug 8/9, as these are likely to be fraudulent.
Click on the diagram to enlarge: